Abstract
Urban rail transit is the construction project under the planning and huge investment of the government. How to effectively conduct investment regulation and control becomes the core question that the government departments are concerned about. In this paper, the relations among government, owner and contractor are studied and the static and dynamic game model is built for behaviors among each subject from the perspective of governmental investment regulation through game theory. Game analysis result shows: (1) the lower the governmental regulation cost the heavier the government's punishment for the owner due to its fail in due diligence and the more the owner's possibility of strict scrutiny; (2) the higher the owner's examination the less willing the owner to conduct narrow examination and the more contractor’s possibility to choose fraudulent conducts; (3) In case of higher income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and lower cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor can adopt collusion strategy while the government can adopt regulatory strategy. In case of lower income of owner and contractor under their collusion strategy and higher cost of governmental regulation, the owner and contractor should not adopt collusion strategy while the government should adopt regulatory strategy. The research result provides theoretical basis for the government to formulate relevant policies for investment regulation of urban rail transit project.
Highlights
Along with the accelerated economic growth and larger governmental investment project scale, urban rail transit has already become the metropolis’s infrastructure project under emphasis-based planning and huge investment construction
As for the investment mode of rail transit project in each metropolis, the local finance accounts for a large proportion while the governmental administrative departments act as the project investor to build metro construction company or business division and act as the agent in full charge of construction management
Based on the studies conducted by our predecessors, the static and dynamic game models for government, owner and contractor are built and the game equilibrium sate of urban rail transit project under the governmental investment regulation is analyzed according to the urban rail transit project under the governmental investment regulation
Summary
Along with the accelerated economic growth and larger governmental investment project scale, urban rail transit has already become the metropolis’s infrastructure project under emphasis-based planning and huge investment construction. By taking Guangzhou metro construction for example, there are 10 lines under construction with total mileage of 263km and total investment of about 143.7 billion Yuan [2]. As for the investment mode of rail transit project in each metropolis, the local finance accounts for a large proportion while the governmental administrative departments act as the project investor to build metro construction company or business division and act as the agent in full charge of construction management. Though all metropolises have positively attempted to introduce new financing modes such as BT and PPP to attract social capitals to participate in urban rail transit construction, the governmental investment takes the leading role and the metro construction company or construction business division still acts the agent. The research conclusion will provide certain reference value for the governmental investment regulation of urban rail transit project
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