Abstract
As the executor of the River Chief System (RCS), local governments’ choice of implementation strategies directly affects the quality of regional water environment. The implementation of the RCS involves many interest subjects, and has gradually formed a game between enterprises’ sewage management and local governments’ RCS implementation strategies, and a game between the RCS implementation strategies of different local governments. The game behavior between the interested parties is long-term and dynamic in nature. Strategies such as reducing the cost of local governments’ implementation of the RCS and increasing the rate of sewage charges will lead to the evolution of the strategy set between enterprises’ treatment of sewage and local governments’ RCS implementation in the direction of {complete treatment of sewage, strictly enforcing the RCS}. Analysis of the evolutionary game model between the local governments reveals that strategies such as reducing the weight of economic indicators in local governments’ assessment, and increasing the material and spiritual rewards for implementing the RCS, will lead to the evolutionary game outcome of implementing the RCS between the local governments in the direction of {strictly enforcing the RCS, strictly enforcing the RCS}. The external effects of sewage discharge do not affect the evolution of the game system between the local governments.
Highlights
In order to alleviate a series of economic and social problems caused by water pollution, China fully implemented the River Chief System at the end of 2018 to strengthen water pollution prevention and control, comprehensively remediate black smelly water bodies, and improve the ecological and environmental governance system
As a result of reducing the cost of complete sewage treatment for polluting enterprises, the cost of River Chief System (RCS) enforcement by local governments, and the weight of the increase in the cost of sewage treatment due to relaxing the RCS implementation, the change in the value of point D leads to an increase in the area of regional ADCB, and the strategy of the dynamic game between sewage enterprises and local governments A is more likely to evolve in the {complete treatment of sewage, strictly enforcing the RCS} direction of evolution
The choice of the RCS implementation strategy by local governments directly affects the quality of the water environment in the watershed
Summary
In order to alleviate a series of economic and social problems caused by water pollution, China fully implemented the River Chief System at the end of 2018 to strengthen water pollution prevention and control, comprehensively remediate black smelly water bodies, and improve the ecological and environmental governance system. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 1961 the analysis of the game between local governments and polluting firms, some studies have analyzed their regulation and rent-seeking, respectively, from the perspective of the Nash equilibrium under mixed strategies [4]. In order to effectively model these dynamic and long-term game relationships, the current article uses an evolutionary game model to explore the evolutionary process of RCS implementation decisions between enterprises and local governments, and between local governments. The exploration of these strategic behaviors is necessary in the process of RCS reform, and helps to reveal the nature of water pollution management in China and improve the efficiency of the implementation of the RCS
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