Abstract
It is important to clearly understand the rent-seeking behavior of all parties involved in the general contracting mode. First, the formation mechanism of rent-seeking was analyzed. Then, the game model of the owners, general contractors, supervision units, government and society during the operation of the general contracting project was proposed, to explore the decision-making space and behavior mechanism of relevant stakeholders. Finally, the optimal decision-making of the game players under different situations was discussed. The results show that the general contractor and supervision rent-seeking probability is affected by the owner’s supervision cost and supervision probability; the probability of owner supervision is related to the ability of owner and government public to supervise and punish rent-seeking behavior; and the ability of government and public to supervise is related to the cost of supervision and the reward value of supervision success.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
