Game Analysis of Endowment Insurance Collection and Supervision Behavior under the Background of Price Reduction

Jin Zhang

doi:10.14738/assrj.71.7633

Abstract

The Central government issued several consecutive articles stressing the need to reduce the contribution rate of endowment insurance and adjust the base of social security contributions. However, can we effectively improve the compliance rate of endowment insurance, and thus increase the actual collection income of endowment insurance through the reform of the fee reduction? What changes will be made to the behavioral decision-making methods among the various subjects, and will it affect the income from the collection of pensions? What kind of supervision is adopted by the central and local governments to promote the increase in the collection of endowment insurance? Based on these problems, this paper adopts the principal-agent game and the three-party evolutionary game model under non-completely symmetric information, analyzes the behavioral decisions of each subject in the process of collection after the fee reduction, and analyzes the influencing factors of dynamic stability and equilibrium. Analysis, and finally, in the context of the endowment insurance fee reduction, the action plan that can effectively increase the income of the endowment insurance collection. The empirical results show that the contribution rate and contribution base of endowment insurance are inversely related to the intensity of local endowment insurance collection, and the reduction of fees can effectively promote the enthusiasm of local governments for collection. When the burden of endowment insurance contributions declines, the enthusiasm of corporate payment has also increased. At the same time, improve the overall level of pensions, promote the openness and transparency of endowment insurance contributions, and strengthen the reward and punishment mechanism in the process of collecting endowment insurance premiums, which can effectively increase the income from endowment insurance collection.

Highlights

Collection and payment are the basis for guaranteeing the operation of endowment insurance system (Liu, 2011)
The reduction of the endowment insurance contribution rate and the adjustment of the payment base have shifted the pressure of endowment insurance benefits to the central and local governments themselves
As the key subject of endowment insurance collection, local governments must play a two-party game with the central government and a three-party game with enterprise workers

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Collection and payment are the basis for guaranteeing the operation of endowment insurance system (Liu, 2011). In order to promote local economic growth, Tend to pursue lower workers costs, incentive distortion and slack in the collection of endowment insurance (Peng, 2010), induce local governments to actively reduce the actual contribution rate of endowment insurance (Gillion et al, 2000), or it may happen Local governments, enterprises, and the masses conspired to evade fees (Duan, 2015). In view of the collection and supervision of endowment insurance, the main analysis of the actual level of contributions and the reasons for the low level of contributions; in the analysis of the impact of different collection agencies on the collection and the local government's The main regulatory situation is insufficient consideration of fee reductions. This article will assume incomplete rationality, construct an evolutionary game model among multiple subjects, and analyze the collection and supervision of endowment insurance after fee reduction. This study sets the evolutionary game relationship of the behavioral relationship of various subjects in the process of endowment insurance premium payment after the fee reduction reform as follows

Evolutionary Game

Saddle point

CONCLUSION