Gadamer, Fricker, and Honneth

Abstract

The individual work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Miranda Fricker, and Axel Honneth each stands on its own as important contributions to a theory of mutual recognition. Our chapter will explore, however, the complementarity that exists between the three. We contend that Gadamer, Fricker, and Honneth together serve to more fully explain and expound a theory of mutual recognition. We begin by examining Gadamer’s groundbreaking understanding of the positive aspect of prejudice as inescapable prejudgements that we have as historical beings – a view that critiques the exclusively negative view of prejudice in Enlightenment rationalism. We then turn to Fricker’s notion of testimonial injustice, followed by an analysis of the complementarity among Gadamer and Fricker. Finally, we briefly look at Honneth on the importance of what he calls ‘social esteem’ for a theory of mutual recognition, in which he folds social esteem into prejudice and testimonial injustice. Although Fricker does not appeal to Gadamer in her examination of the role of prejudice in either testimonial or hermeneutical injustice, their respective projects disclose several intersecting themes and concerns. In addition, Fricker’s focus on instances where dialogical engagement breaks down or fails beneficially expands Gadamer’s analyses of prejudice and his emphasis on what is required for genuine dialogue. Conversely, Gadamer’s emphasis on openness and anticipatory listening complements Fricker’s account. Gadamer’s understanding of prejudgements as integral to our historical being and as having a positive, productive role is resonant with a number of Fricker’s claims and, if more explicitly accepted and developed, would alleviate concerns that Linda Martín Alcoff and Georgia Warnke have, respectively, voiced regarding Fricker’s appeals to neutrality. Honneth explicates three kinds of recognition and how the first two, recognition as love and recognition as rights, fall short of the demands of political and social justice. Only when a “social addressee” is given “social esteem” – a form of recognition that respects difference and accepts others as full participants in social life within their differences – can mutual recognition serve justice fully.