Abstract
Abstract. In this reply to Dahlman (2004), the focus is on aspects that I take to be of general interest. The point to be emphasised is the absence of a critically reflexive mode of questioning on the part of Dahlman and, in general, on the part of the position he represents, namely, an empiricist and logical paradigm of atemporal cognition and control. It is argued that lawyers’ thinking de lege lata—with its distinctive connection to normativity and morals, through the unity of the temporal and institutional dimensions in fused modality—can never be understood within such a framework.
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