Fundamental Rights and Merit Goods: The Case of the VAT Exemptions in the Public Interest

Abstract

AbstractThis contribution aims at providing both a current example of how a collaboration in tax matters between economists and lawyers could be highly beneficial in tax matters and how fundamental values can step up in this conversation. In particular, the following analysis focuses on the exemptions for public interests listed in Article 132 of the EU Value Added Tax Directive (from now on VAT Directive) which refer to some of the traditional merit goods as so considered by economists. The same exemptions could be also read under the light of the European Fundamental Rights Charter which covers not only civil and political rights but also socio-economic ones. Moreover, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, we can find “social justice” as one of the core values that the Union is committed to promote and which therefore should guide the Union’s policies. However, economic studies have shown that there might be some downsides to the adoption of VAT exemptions, especially in terms of social and redistributive goals. VAT exemptions aimed at ensuring those merit goods/fundamental rights might erode the tax base and backlash on the wider goal of social justice. From a legal perspective, they lead to several interpretative issues. In spite of its theoretical interest and practical importance, there is still not too much literature on this topic and none addressing this issue from a fundamental rights and values perspective. The purpose of this paper is to be a starting point for further discussions on how economic and legal studies together can provide better solutions on how to handle merit goods in VAT by keeping in mind the broader picture of a fair tax system and legal principles, such as those enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.