Functionalism and Propositional Attitudes

Abstract

Functionalism is the thesis that one is in a given mental state just in case one is in a state that bears certain appropriate (causal) relations to other mental states, to sensory inputs, and to behavioral outputs. ' The empirical functionalist claims, in addition, that these functional relationships are to be determined by empirical investigation rather than by any kind of conceptual analysis.2 This brand of functionalism, currently much in favor, is, I argue, no more acceptable than its behavioral and physicalistic predecessors. I will not attempt to provide any one general knock-down argument. Rather, my strategy (section II) is to consider how inputs might plausibly be specified in such functional accounts, and in each case I argue that the resulting theory provides inadequate conditions for propositional attitudes. I will argue by way of counterexamples: counterexamples which are by no means novel in character but whose relevance for the philosophy of mind has been systematically underestimated. Section III is devoted to a discussion as to how and why they have been so perceived. Before entering into any argument I want to provide a very brief discussion of the position I am attacking (section I). I will be concerned only to highlight crucial elements in the account, and I will not attempt to dojustice to the many possible versions of empirical functionalism, nor to the virtues of these different accounts.