Abstract
The freedom of a decision is not yet sufficiently described as a psychological variable. We present a model of functional decision freedom that aims to fill that role. The model conceptualizes functional freedom as a capacity of people that varies depending on certain conditions of a decision episode. It denotes an inner capability to consciously shape complex decisions according to one’s own values and needs. Functional freedom depends on three compensatory dimensions: it is greatest when the decision-maker is highly rational, when the structure of the decision is highly underdetermined, and when the decision process is strongly based on conscious thought and reflection. We outline possible research questions, argue for psychological benefits of functional decision freedom, and explicate the model’s implications on current knowledge and research. In conclusion, we show that functional freedom is a scientific variable, permitting an additional psychological foothold in research on freedom, and that is compatible with a deterministic worldview.
Highlights
For a long time, the reality of free will has been debated within philosophy
It was argued that autonomous and free action regulation is of high value to research on well-being and motivation [8]; that free and less-free actions can be operationalized in terms of capacities such as self-control [9]; and that variations in just the belief in free will already yield impacts on moral behavior [10]
Is the model of functional freedom at odds with a deterministic framework? No, because its extent is clearly limited by natural factors, and the conditions of freedom themselves are the object of determination by mental, biological and social factors
Summary
The reality of free will has been debated within philosophy. Elaborate arguments have been put forward in favor of, as well as against, its compatibility with a deterministic world [1,2,3,4]. Instead of participating in this debate, we presume that psychology can develop its own models of decision freedom, without metaphysical ballast, for the purpose of a productive engagement with the topic of human freedom [5,6]. Recent research has demonstrated that folk psychological notions of free will do not seem to revolve around metaphysical assumptions (e.g., a soul or the absence of causal determination), but instead are rooted in beliefs about choice capacities [13,14]. The gist of all these intriguing approaches is that psychology does not need to engage in the metaphysical debate about free will [5], but should go ahead with own naturalistic, operationalizable notions of freedom as a capacity in decision-making [15,16] and action generation [12]. In the course of this paper, we will derive and develop these dimensions and their indicators, as well as discuss the adaptive benefits of free decisions and the resulting implications for further research
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