Function Follows Form: The Organizational Design of Peace Operations

Abstract

This article challenges the view that peace operations are rationally designed to select an optimal organizational structure for operational performance. Instead, two dynamics lead to the adoption of dysfunctional organizational structures. First, different preferences among state and organizational actors involved in planning a peace operation (‘heterogeneity of the sponsoring coalition’) lead to diffused authority (‘heterarchical design’) in peace operations structures. Second, characteristics of the organizational environment (‘ambiguity’ and ‘stickiness’) in which peace operations are authorized and planned cause the adoption of dysfunctional organizational structures. Investigating briefly the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the article finds the hypothesized relationships consistent with the finding of the cases. While function does not always follow form there are strong indications that it often does in the international context.