Fuller and Arendt: A Happy Marriage? Comment on Rundle

Abstract

In her article on the need to develop a ‘public legal theory through Fuller and Arendt’, Rundle aims to develop further the theoretical thrust of her important book Forms Liberate by focusing on a more general question, namely how to develop a normative legal theory that is distinctively public or political. She aims to do so primarily by bringing Fuller into conversation with Arendt. In this comment, I want to add some caveats with regard to the viability of this conversation. Obviously, I am not claiming that Arendt’s work could not or should not be brought into conversation with Fuller simply because Arendt never claimed to be a legal scholar. That is not a convincing argument at all. Yet, it is my conjecture that the position to which Rundle brings us in Forms Liberate leaves perhaps an insufficient basis for such a conversation. In brief, the gap that divides Arendt from Fuller in Rundle’s reading might well be too large to bridge. In order to develop this claim, I shall rely to quite some extent on Rundle’s book. The best way to start is its well-chosen title, which indicates at least three things.