Full Spectrum Operations: Is This the Science of Victory?

Abstract

Abstract : The U.S. Army's current operating concept of Full Spectrum Operations is nothing more than a return to an earlier concept: Flexible Response. The Army adopted Flexible Response in the early 1960s to mitigate the threat posed by Soviet nuclear, conventional, and unconventional capabilities in Western Europe. The Army made a calculated decision to adopt that concept based upon its understanding of the nature of the threat posed to national strategic aims by the Soviet military in Western Europe, the likely geographic location of a conflict. No such calculus exists today. Instead, the Army has adopted the operating concept of Full Spectrum Operations, which is outdated and out of its original context. This is an error that poses a security risk to the United States. The error exists in part because of the method the Army uses to develop its operating concepts. Today, the U.S. Army uses a capabilities-based approach to operating concept development instead of the threat-based approach it used in the past. The Army justifies this change in approach based on the belief that the fluid nature of the post-Cold War world would preclude traditional, threat-based assessments. Change would be a constant, and any operating concept would have to keep pace with change. However, as demonstrated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, not even the capabilities-based concept of Full Spectrum Operations is up to the task. It failed to adapt quickly enough to mitigate threats in the security environment. History provides more than one example of successful operating concept development using threat assessment. The Soviet concept of deep operations is one example that successfully survived the rigor of combat. Contrasting this example to the current operating concept of Full Spectrum Operations will reveal the current concept's failings and the risks it poses to U.S. strategic aims.