Frustration of Purpose

Abstract

For all its merits, case law is incapable of inculcating Cartesian thinking, thinking which is clear and distinct. Admittedly the legislature also is not always careful in making apparent the ratio of its enactments—sometimes it is not even aware thereof—but at least it will not consciously obliterate distinctions. By contrast, case law normally masks its innovations and postulates conceptions which are somewhat vague. It is consequently natural to regard with suspicion any endeavour to mark out clear-cut boundaries, much in the manner of Roman thinking that “all definitions in law are dangerous”.Considerations such as these are awakened, for example, in connection with the leading case ofKrellv.Henry, the most well-known of the “Coronation cases”. To determine the force and significance of this precedent is a primary task in English law itself because on that will depend whether or not it is innovatory; but it is especially crucial in point of Israel law for the purpose of deciding whether it has any foothold in this country.