From War to Deterrence? Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Since 2006

Abstract

FOREWORDThe 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah has generated a vast amount of academic and military studies, including a number from the Strategic Studies Institute. Specifically, authors have tried to identify the new patterns of warfare through this conflict and sometimes have even called it the first illustration of hybrid war. This new monograph by Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan does not look at the war itself but rather at its aftermath, both in Israel and Lebanon. It starts from an obvious paradox: Despite the regional turmoil and the absence of a settlement between Israel and Hezbollah, stability has prevailed since 2006. While over the same time frame the Middle East has been experiencing one of its most unpredictable periods in the last decades, the border area between Israel and Lebanon has remained quiet.Dr. Samaan explains that this paradox can be understood through the use of deterrence theories. Because both sides understood that a next round would be devastating and that each could not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first wave of deterrence, the solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to deter the other party from attacking its homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation. To support his claim, Dr. Samaan relies extensively on several field trips in countries, during which he conducted numerous interviews, examined official statements, and gathered grey literature.Dr. Samaan makes an important contribution to both policy and academic debates over the logic of war between Israel and Hezbollah. In that perspective, his discussion paves the way to a new appraisal of deterrence applied to nonstate actors, as well of escalation dynamics in the Levant. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph on the role of the U.S. Army and the manner in which it can best serve the nation today and in the future.DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College PressSUMMARYFor 7 years now, the border area between Israel and Lebanon has witnessed calm and stability. At first sight, this has all the appearances of a paradox. The 2006 war between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese organization, Hezbollah, was followed neither by a peace agreement nor by a mere diplomatic process. Both sides prepared their forces to wage the next war and additionally have been confronted in past years to major changes in the distribution of power in the Middle East in the midst of the so-called Arab Spring.Against all odds, the area comprising north Israel and south Lebanon remained very quiet these last months. This monograph argues that the key to understand this paradox is the game of deterrence played by both Israel and Hezbollah. Specifically, an informal deterrence dialogue has been developing between Israel and Hezbollah and that strategic stability prevailed because of this indirect exchange.Because both sides understood that a next round would be devastating and that each could not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first wave the solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to deter the other party from attacking its homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation.But to say that stability has been preserved between Israel and Hezbollah thanks to deterrence does not mean that this is a perennial state. This monograph also stresses the precariousness of such deterrence system. The stand-off between Israel and Hezbollah reached this level only through specific measures and conditions that can be reversed in the future. In particular, exogenous factors such as the unraveling of the Syrian civil war or the developments of the Iranian nuclear issue can jeopardize the equilibrium. Moreover, the study of Lebanese politics emphasizes the uncertainties related to the logic of deterrence with a nonstate actor like Hezbollah. This is why this analysis offers a cautious look at deterrence theories in the Middle East and reminds that such situations are neither naturally engendered nor eternally established. …