Abstract
Living in times of increasing complexity is hard; it becomes even harder with the realisation of diminishing control. How do we adapt our governance to this complexity to ensure peaceful cohabitation of the established and emergent order regimes? This paper contends that it is important to embrace complexity in full, conceptually and practically, by shifting from ‘the global’ to ‘the local’, to understand the pressure of transformational change and to prepare the ground for the emergence of more resilient and cooperative orders. We apply this complexity-thinking, using a 3P analysis, to Central Eurasia, presently a battleground of three competing order-making regimes—the EU, China and Russia. We argue that for more resilient and cooperative orders to emerge, it is essential to understand and enable ‘the local’ and embrace the region in is diversity, to facilitate a more joined-up and bottom-up governance in managing the complexity of a changing world.
Highlights
From the VUCA‐world to more cooperative governance? We live in a complex world
To live with change knowingly, observing its accelerating pace (Beck 1992) and the emergence of what is known as a VUCA-world—of increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (Burrows and Gnad 2017)—may even lead to an ontological crisis, affecting an individual’s sense of order and continuity with the future, their relationships and experiences (Flockhart 2020)
Before we proceed to examining the interplay of competing strategies by the European Union (EU), China and Russia over the region in order to ascertain complexity challenges for the emergent order(s) there, it is essential that first, we introduce the fifth IR debate, or ‘Complex International Relations’ (Kavalski 2007) as our conceptual premise, and posit the argument about the relational nature of complexity (Qin and Nordin 2019) to understand change, and second, we introduce a 3P framework developed by Flockhart (2020), to help comprehend how to deal with the growing complexity in the Eurasian region
Summary
The EU has come a long way in spearheading its order-building initiatives especially towards the eastern neighbourhood. The objective was to exert a form of disciplinary governance over Central Eurasia by using soft power means, including the inherent cultural affinity with the region and appealing to people directly To this end, a broad range of resources and mechanisms was developed, e.g. the Direct line with the President, Russkiy Mir Foundation, the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, Friendship Society etc. Its position towards the BRI could be described more as a policy of ‘sopryazhenie’ rather than alignment, contrary to its rhetoric of ever-closer partnership with China (Bossuyt and Bolgova 2020) This raises questions about Russia’s professed commitment to regional alignment—be it vis-à-vis its strategic partners or with the wider region— and its understanding of complexity which seems to be erring towards hegemony rather than cooperation. Lavrov’s called, a ‘Greater Eurasian order’.28 The practice, has shown that the politics of ‘sopryazhenie’ even in theory would struggle to create a ‘shared normal’, let alone a ‘shared order’, be it with Asia or with the EU, from Lisbon to Vladivostok
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
