Abstract
Within a multiparty civil war involving domestic rivalries and regional antagonisms, the Kurdish-led PYD-YPG rebel movement managed to consolidate its political-military power in northeastern Syria. Using the analytical framework of Political Opportunity Structures (POS), we describe how, through its ability to maintain organizational cohesion and establish its own governance structures, and by forging alliances with domestic and foreign actors, it became the hegemonic power in the territory. Whereas it initially relied on coercive consolidation against its main Kurdish rivals, to secure local and international support against the significant threat posed by the Islamic State it had to shift to cooperative and cooptation strategies of power consolidation.
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