Abstract

Abstract The utilities sectors in the EC were historically excluded from the scope of both the GATT Codes on Public Procurement and the EC public procurement rules which came into force in the 1970s. Thus it is not surprising that the decision to incorporate these major industrial sectors into the Single Market rules has been politically contentious. The resulting conflict has produced utilities procurement rules which are far less onerous than those for the public sector. In explaining why this is the case, we demonstrate that private utilities firms were able to win policy concessions by employing the mobilization of bias within EC policy‐making bodies, as well as by using conventional political lobbying and pressure. However, while private actors were able to mobilize bias to achieve their intended effect at the policy initiation stage, the implementation of the utilities rules has been less than a success. The reason for this is that the two main concessions which the utilities were able to win (a 50 ...

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