From the Constitutional Revolution to the Shiite Ideology

Abstract

AbstractWhy did the Islamic Revolution happen? Was the monarchy responsible to facilitate the actualization of its own fall? How the theocratic regime in Iran can be understood? Can the Islamic Republic be considered as a new form of political conservatism? This chapter along with the previous one addresses central tenets of the book. It illustrates the principal overlook on the issue of the failed democratization that has been coined as the most unforgettable sin of the monarchy. As the previous chapter reviews the pretexts of the rapid collapse of the system and continues to clarify the background of antagonist image of the Shah that the Iranian public idea has pictured, the current chapter pursues fundamental considerations on the Iranian conservatism by reminding the subject as monarchic body, indicating its ancient status, and reexamining Pahlavi conservatism particularly.The neglected fact after the downfall of monarchy was that the defects of Pahlavi conservatism could not be the single and independent cause of the 1979 crisis. The Pahlavi conservatism failed due to the characteristics that it inherited from the lasting Iranian despotic culture. The main failure of Pahlavis and their impossible obligation was to provide a smooth transition from Iranian despotism to Iranian democracy. The adversaries of the monarchy stand far from the mentioned spectrum, where tyrannical ideologies take place.Relevantly, the chapter reviews the Iranian public impression of the Islamic Revolution that fluctuates continuously between something that was predetermined and something that showed the will of the masses. The ambivalent feeling about the Revolution 1979 is in conjunction with a similar emotion about the Shah. As a self-destructive attitude, the former revolutionaries sometimes wish the Shah would have stopped them. Therefore, the chapter sheds some light on how is more realistic to understand the Revolution and the Shah. Furthermore, it explains the Machiavelist approach of the anti-Shah opposition under the term sacred instrumentalism. The moral depravity of revolutionaries allowed them to commit any misdeeds which, in Burkean terminology, violated the Iranian “moral imagination”.On the post-revolutionary Iran, the chapter draws some overarching assessments of the structure and substance of the current hierocracy. It clarifies how the Islamic Republic with its stubborn shape has pictured itself as a shapeless regime. The historical Shi'ite survival instinct helps the Iranian theocracy to play within its ideological boundaries with opposite approaches and rhetorics. In this regard, the decisive role of Shi'ite nationalism is being criticized. Similarly, the chapter deals with political reformers and religious reformers within the clerical system. Both groups ended up with contrary results in comparison to their claims. Instead of reforming politics and reforming religion, both reformer groups used their own reform plan to justify the foundations of theocracy, especially its regional policy, and to glorify the character of its founder, i.e., Khomeini. The iconic part of the chapter that illustrates a scheme for the future of Iran is the comparison between the Green Movement of 2009 and the patriotic protests since 2018. While the first had some overlaps with ideals of 1979 mostly due to the Khomeinist leadership of the movement, the latter with explicit pro-Pahlavi slogans demonstrates a determined detachment from the ideological discourse of 1979. The chapter finalizes the review of the Islamic Republic by reminding that beclouding the distinction between Iranian culture as a valuable heritage and clerical discrimination is a clear example of the Western misknowledge about the Middle East which has brought severe consequences. The conclusion of the book is a reassessment of historical possibilities and restrictions in Iran to presumably prevent the Islamic Revolution and to realistically build a future out of the disorder since 1979.