Abstract

Axel Honneth argues for a 'formal conception of ethical life' as the core of a social theory with normative content which postulates three types of recognition as the preconditions for any autonomous agent: intersubjective relations of emotional recognition, legal recognition and solidarity (or recognition of accomplishments) namely, that promote and maintain the development of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem in individuals. This orientation toward dimensions of everyday interaction, which allows Honneth to construe injustices as violations of social expectations regarding recognition, distinguishes his approach from those of both Jurgen Habermas's own version of critical theory and John Rawls's political liberalism. He has recently proposed that this formal conception of the good life be used as the basis for a plural concept of justice. In this interview, we discuss his manner of deriving a theory of justice from social theory which, on the one hand, continues a Hegelian method that reconstructs a normative standpoint immanent within social practices but which, on the other hand, goes beyond Hegel by incorporating within this standpoint the potential for transforming and transcending existing social roles within contemporary society. The purview of the interview was established by our agreement to focus on Honneth's newly developed plural conception of justice, its implications with respect to contemporary social issues such as feminism, his conceptualization of social pathologies, and the differences of his own theory from other theories of justice. The interview focuses on his methodology of connecting a theory of justice with the diagnosis of social pathologies and how such a method differs from, for example, contemporary Kantian methods such as Rawls's own strictly political approach to a theory of justice and even Habermas's recent work. We discuss what state legislation he would defend on the basis of his newly formulated theory of justice in order to protect different recognition relationships and how such legislation can become more inclusive or emancipatory. In this respect, Honneth answers how his theory would address injustice to women on certain issues and how it differs in this respect from Rawls's political liberalism. In addition, Honneth explains the differences between his own theory of recognition and those of Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler, as well as the extent to which his own formal conception of the good life accords with the fact of reasonable pluralism. Finally, he briefly explains how he conceives of the relation between the social and the normative within his theory of recognition.1

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