Abstract
Abstract According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way.
Highlights
Kirk Ludwig (2016; 2017a) has provided a detailed and systematic reductive event-causal theory of human agency
My focus will be on Ludwig’s claims about the ontology of such actions, but I will touch on issues concerning the semantics of singular action sentences and the typical content of ordinary individual action intentions
Ludwig’s analysis of the singular action sentence “I turned on the light” would be as follows: There is an event e and a time t before now such that at t I was a primitive agent of an event f that directly causes e and only I am an agent of e in that way and e is the turning on of the light
Summary
Kirk Ludwig (2016; 2017a) has provided a detailed and systematic reductive event-causal theory of human agency. Ludwig’s analysis of the singular action sentence “I turned on the light” would be as follows: There is an event e and a time t before now such that at t I was a primitive agent of an event f that directly causes e and only I am an agent of e in that way and e is the turning on of the light.. Agents often have intentions to bring about an event such that these intentions can be satisfied even if other agents bring about the event in the same way
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