From Siberia to Kuibyshev Reflections on Russia, 1919–1943

Abstract

Few episodes in Canadian history are so strange as the Canadian military intervention in Siberia during 1918 and 1919. It illustrated both Canadian immaturity in international affairs and the confidence acquired through participation in a European war. It was decided upon before that war was over and reflected British preoccupation with other theatres of conflict, making it difficult for the United Kingdom to spare troops for peripheral operations. Whatever the motives, the Canadian Government appear to have decided upon participation in the Siberian operations without a clear understanding of what was involved. There was a great deal of confusion at the time about the Russian situation. The Communist government of Russia in the previous winter had concluded peace with Germany through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This meant that the rapidly disintegrating Russian armies were now formally demobilized. It began to be said that all that was required to restore order in Russia was a small disciplined force. This argument had a powerful effect on right-wing thinking in Great Britain and other countries. Finally, there were fears that the large number of German, and the still larger number of Austro-Hungarian, prisoners-of-war, who were being released from prison camps in Siberia but without available means of transport to their homelands, would be organized by the Central Powers to seize control of the Trans-Siberian Railway and thus threaten Allied interests in the Far East.