Abstract

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness’. Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.

Highlights

  • This was followed by pointing to three types of temporal integration: integration between inputs into a content, integration of content with other contents, and integration of phenomenal contents within the ongoing stream of consciousness

  • To close this temporal gap, we propose converging the Information Theory (IIT) with the TTC, the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness, as that takes into view multiple timescales including both short- and long-term

  • The TTC assumes temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism for the interaction of pre-stimulus and post-stimulus activity, which it deems key for constituting phenomenal content

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Summary

IIT and Its Axioms—Phenomenal Content and Its Temporal Characterization

How does the inner activity of a system, like the neuronal activity of the brain, transform into the experience of phenomenal contents in our ongoing consciousness? One of the most relevant neuroscientific theories of consciousness, Integrated Information Theory (IIT), claims that if a system has the intrinsic potential to integrate information, we can assume the presence of consciousness [1,2,3,4,5]. Recent studies provide a possible answer to the role of intrinsic neural timescales in inferring future inputs; with an empirical prior and prediction error, based on the temporospatial carry-over and continuation of ongoing activity within the post-stimulus interval, the task states during which the respective content is consciously experienced [39,40]. In this regard, the prediction error is the difference between the ongoing (from pre-stimulus to stimulus period) relevant timescale in the primary sensory area (e.g., a short timescale) to the related timescale of the input at a discrete point in time (e.g., a musical note). It shall be mentioned that we recently provided a first attempt to describe the pre-post-stimulus relationship in mathematical terms and that the use of category theory allowed us to formalize the pre-post-stimulus relationship explicitly in relational terms [43]

From Pre-Stimulus to Stimulus-Induced Activity—Neuro-Phenomenal Mechanisms
Temporo-Spatial Context and Pre-Phenomenal Experience
Temporo-Spatial Background and Phenomenal Experience
Conclusions
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