From Security Sector Reform to Endemic Corruption: The Case of Afghanistan

Abstract

Corruption and insecurity are reinforcing each other. It can hinder the democratic processes and jeopardize the security sector through creating corrupt administrative systems, manipulation of contracts and procurement. After the decomposition of the Taliban in 2001, the U.S.-led coalition carried out Security Sector Reform (SSR) to (re) construct the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) together known as Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Over critical literature, there are serious critiques concerning the U.S. and its allies’ scrimmage for their role in conducting the SSR in Afghanistan. The research argues that the lack of a long-term strategic vision for conducting SSR as part of the state-building process by the international community was a critical challenge. This crux has further been exacerbated by the privatization of SSR and the contrast between the U.S. and its European allies on the role of the police. This dichotomy affected the anti-corruption and law enforcement potentials of police, which resulted in the present crisis. Additionally, this research figures out that insufficient oversight of contracts and procurement, training and advising processes of the ANDSF gave more room for misappropriation, theft, and fraud by both the local and international contractors. Finally, all these shortfalls together with constant turnover have undermined the counterinsurgency efforts of Afghan forces on the ground. Therefore, endless military operation without any tangible results has wearied the people, and further added fodder to the terrorist propaganda machine.