From rhetoric to action, a constitutional analysis of populism

Théo Fournier

doi:10.1017/glj.2019.22

Abstract

AbstractThe article considers populism not as common ideology but as a common strategy for implementing various distinct ideologies. Constitutional democracy and populist strategy are inherently connected. Populist strategies develop a specific rhetoric which takes root in the features of constitutional democracy. The populist rhetoric manipulates the rule-of-law and the majoritarian pillars of constitutional democracy by convincing a fictional majority that constitutional democracy gives rise to a tyranny of minorities. Populism in action represents the second facet of the populist strategy. It corresponds to a specific constitutional strategy of legal and constitutional reforms aiming at disrupting constitutional democracy. After exposing my theoretical assumption, I move to a comparative study of two countries, France and Hungary, selected according to the most different cases approach. I analyze first how Viktor Orban based his constitutional strategy on a progressive deconstruction of the post-communist legacy. I study then how Marine le Pen’s strategy consisted of a comprehensive reform of the French semi-presidential system via referendum. I finally conclude by recalling the essential role academics have to play in the fight against populism. My last point is a provocation, what if calling populism by its real diversity (fascism, racism and antisemitism) was the most efficient way to fight them?

Highlights

The article considers populism not as common ideology but as a common strategy for implementing various distinct ideologies
Populism in action represents the second facet of the populist strategy
It corresponds to a specific constitutional strategy of legal and constitutional reforms aiming at disrupting constitutional democracy

Summary

The equilibrium of constitutional democracies against the populist strategy

The relation between populism and constitutional democracy is comparable to a process of parasitism in which constitutional democracy would be the host and populism would be the parasite. The rule of law pillar limits the choices of the majority and protects non-majoritarian individuals from the consequences of not belonging to the majority.. Populist rhetoric denies any legitimacy of the winning party to represent the Nation because the candidate was elected thanks to a strategic cooperation of minorities. At such a point, anything but the Nation is in power. Protection against the tyranny of minorities stands for a superiority of the majority pillar over the rule of law pillar— it disrupts the original equilibrium of constitutional democracy. The hypothetical victory of a populist party does not change the rhetoric on the rule of law, which is accommodated only with the unified and uncompromised majority. What is the point of constraining the will of the majority if the same majority is always right?

Populist in action and political reality

The Fidesz constitutional corpus

The content of Marine Le Pen’s constitutional program

The constitutional weaknesses of the French constitutional democracy

Findings

Conclusion