Abstract
While formerly planned economies lack critical institutions, ailing welfare economies have too many, reducing investment incentives in both. While institutional redesign is urgent in the formerly planned economies, there is no instant concern in the West, where institutional change must be realized through reluctant democratic procedures. Some formerly planned economies, therefore, are likely to improve upon the West in institutional design and experience superior long-run economic growth. They explicitly link investment incentives one way to property rights and the other to investment and growth, to demonstrate how such superior performance can be achieved.
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