Abstract
This article explains the unanticipated emergence of party-oriented legislators and rising party discipline in Brazil since the early 1990s. The authors contend that deputies in Brazil became increasingly party oriented because the utilities of party-programmatic and patronage-based electoral strategies shifted with market reforms that created a programmatic cleavage in Brazilian politics and diminished the resource base for state patronage. The study introduces new measures of partisan campaigns, party polarization, and values that legislators attached to party programs and voter loyalty based on an original survey of the Brazilian Congress. Regression analysis confirms that deputies who believe that voters value party programs have run partisan, programmatic campaigns, and those in polarized parties and those who believe voters are loyal to the party are willing to delegate authority to party leaders and do not switch parties. Party polarization and the proximity of deputies' policy preferences to their party's mean explain discipline on 236 roll-call votes in the 51st legislature (1999-2001).
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