From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise

Abstract

In 1914 Daniel Hoan, the socialist city attorney of Milwaukee, pronounced regulation of public utilities a “complete fizzle.” Hoan's conclusion was based on years spent battling the imperious Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light Company with the limited legal tools at the city's disposal. He argued that even in Wisconsin, where regulatory agencies were at their most efficient and honest, it was impossible for public utility commissions to force good service at moderate cost from investor-owned companies. Commissioners would only push so far, realistically fearing they might drive private capital out of the state. Thus, in Hoan's opinion, the only sensible course was “to secure the democratic control of collectively owned property.” Despite this conviction and his astonishingly successful political career—spanning thirty years as an openly socialist public official, including twenty-four as Milwaukee's mayor—he retired from politics in 1940 having socialized only a stone quarry and the city's streetlights. As with many other local socialist officeholders in the United States, Hoan left a robust legacy of honest, efficient, and humane administration. But when it came to expanding public ownership, his record was meager.1