From morality to moral emotions

Abstract

Morals (defined in terms of justice, well‐being, and rights) can be distinguished from social conventionalities, which are standards for particular behaviours that are determined consensually by a certain social group. In all cultures, the notions of psychological damage, injustice, and violation of rights have been determinants for the concept of morals. The study of moral behaviour has been dominated for decades by theories that emphasize the role of reasoning in the moral judgment of adults. Debates about morality have occupied the centre of discussion among theoreticians. Morality‐driven behaviours have traditionally been attributed to logically and verbally mediated processes, commonly referred to as moral reasoning and judgment. However, certain aptitudes, such as social sensitivity and cognition, have been considered to lie at the heart of the evolution of humankind. The assimilation of rules based on punishment or reward, and the attribution of intentions, beliefs, feelings, and desires to other people are some examples of these aptitudes, which are now considered or interpreted as forerunners of human morality. The study of emotions—moral emotions in particular—has increased significantly in the last few decades. Recent proposals have emphasized the role of emotional and intuitive processes in human decision making and thatemotionsare central to the solution of basic problems and to interpersonal relationships. This change in perspective is the result of recent work in the fields of philosophy, cognitive psychology, affective neurosciences, and neurobiology. The field of affective neurosciences has begun to explore different types of moral emotions with different techniques, in particular neuroimaging techniques. In the field of neurobiology, investigators have started to study neural correlates of moral emotions, and have encountered interesting findings, which indicate that the human brain shows a network specialized in moral processing.