From ménage à trois back to pas de deux? Ministerial advisers, civil servants and the contest of policy ideas

Richard Shaw,Chris Eichbaum

doi:10.4000/irpp.1502

Richard Shaw, Chris Eichbaum

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.1502

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Abstract

The institutionalization of the role of ministerial advisers in most parliamentary democracies has transformed what was once à pas de deux between ministers and senior civil servants into a ménage à trois. This article assesses the impact of ministerial advisers on the contest of policy ideas. It makes a theoretical case for paying closer attention to this issue than has thus far been the case, and assesses civil servants’ perceptions of advisers’ influence on contestability. The core conclusion, which is at variance with much of the scholarship on ministerial advisers, is that advisers pose a greater threat to policy contestability than to civil service impartiality.

Highlights

The institutionalization of the role of ministerial advisers in many parliamentary democracies has transformed what was once a pas de deux between ministers and senior civil servants into a ménages à trois (De Visscher & Salomonsen, 2012)
The core conclusion, which is at variance with much of the scholarship on ministerial advisers, is that advisers pose a greater threat to policy contestability than to civil service impartiality
Key findings are discussed: the major conclusion, which is at variance with much of the scholarship on ministerial advisers, is that advisers pose a greater threat to policy contestability than to civil service impartiality

Summary

Introduction

The institutionalization of the role of ministerial advisers in many parliamentary democracies has transformed what was once a pas de deux between ministers and senior civil servants into a ménages à trois (De Visscher & Salomonsen, 2012). Politicization and contestability are not synonyms but they are connected – one response to the question, ‘Why is politicization an issue?’ is, ‘Because it diminishes the quality of the policy contest’. It is one thing for ministerial advisers to politicize civil service advice and another to seek to exclude officials from the policy conversation itself. The debate regarding advisers’ effects on civil service impartiality (which is well developed) must be complemented by consideration of the ramifications of their agency for the wider policy contest (about which much less is known)

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