From Mania to Bipolar Disorder

Abstract

When the first asylums opened, around 1800, mania was a generic term for insanity. Philippe Pinel’s Treatise on Insanity that appeared in 1800was accordingly namedTrait e sur la Manie. For 2000 years before Pinel, the chief determinant of diagnosis in medicine lay in the visible presentation of the patient. These visible presentations could lead to reliable diagnoses of tumours, diabetes, catatonia, epilepsy and insanity. The visible presentations of insanity involved flushing, overactivity and maniacal behaviour. Mania was diagnosed in patients who were overactive and who might now be seen as having schizophrenia, depression, delirium, senility, imbecility and other conditions. Pinel took a stand on the importance of science in medicine, and was the first to call for an Evidence Based Medicine. Faced with patients hospitalized for years, he was the first to incorporate the course of apatients’disorders into his diagnostic considerations. He recorded outcomes where patientswere treated or left untreated, andnoting responses followed by relapses, argued that some disorders were periodic or recurrent and that the vast majority of available treatments made the underlying condition worse. When a final and more complete version of his treatise was published in 1809, it distinguished in its title, Trait e M edico-Philosophique sur l’Ali enation Mentale ou la Manie, between insanity in general and a new, more specific diagnosis of mania [1]. Once this distinction was made, and mania was separated out from idiocy dementia and melancholia, the rates of admission formania settled at approximately 50% of all admissions in asylums in Europe and America until around 1900. While asylumnomenclature remained relatively constant for a century, there was an evolution in the thinking about insanity. The idea that theremight be a distinctmood faculty that could be disordered in its own right was put forward in the 1830s by one of Pinel’s pupils, Jean-Dominique Etienne Esquirol, who described profound sadness – lypemanie – as a distinct disorder. The notion of a disease entity took shape in the 1850s when two of Esquirol’s pupils, Jean-Pierre Falret and Jules Baillarger, both described disorders that laid the basis for what became circular insanity. Falret outlined folie circulaire; Baillarger termed his disorder folie a double forme [2]. The idea that mania or insanity might give rise to protean manifestations had posed little difficulty, but as clinicians moved towards the concept of a disease entity, they had difficulties with the idea that two clinical states that looked so different might be presentations of the same underlying disease state. In their efforts to overcome these conceptual problems, both Falret andBaillarger posited a disorderwith alternating cycles of mania and melancholia of fixed length and with fixed intervals between episodes. But crucially if neither the superficial features of mania nor the superficial features of melancholia accounted for the disorder, then some common ground between them must be responsible for the disorder. Some substrate must be diseased. The new disorder was not one that commanded clinical attention. Both men conceded that what they were describing was a rare condition. The condition described was moreover at this point not clearly a mood disorder. Others described alternating or circular insanity. None of these states were bipolar affective disorder, as that termwould be understood today. The first to approach modern bipolar disorder was Karl Kahlbaum who in 1883 described cyclothymia. Where circular insanity was a psychotic disorder, with regular and stable features that led todegeneration, cyclothymiawas for Kahlbaum a specific mood disorder from which patients could recover. Kahlbaum also introduced disease course as a classificatory principle, but this was resisted. Most academics at the time expected a localization of clinical features in different brain areas to provide the key to unlocking the mysteries of mental illness rather than disease course. However disease coursewas used byCharcot to distinguish between hysteria and Tourette’s syndrome, and later to distinguish between Alzheimer’s and Creutfeld-Jacob disease.