From Fable to Fact

Abstract

I devote this chapter to the exposition of a fable. While diminutive, it is incisive: It captures the incentives that drive the choices that lead to the failure of states. It is also suggestive, for it points to the conditions under which political order should, or should not, prevail. After expositing this fable, I determine whether it is also informative. It can be so only insofar as the forces that animate its central characters find their parallel in late-century Africa. I devote the last portions of the chapter to arguing that they do and that the story communicated by the fable can therefore bear the weight of the tragedy that befell the continent. The fable can be used – with help – to explore the foundations of political disorder. A Fable Consider the following scenario: A community is peopled by a “specialist in violence” and two groups of citizens. Headed by powerful patrons, the groups can act in a unified manner. The specialist in violence earns his living from the use of force; he either seizes the wealth of others or pockets funds they pay for their protection. Sheltered behind their patrons, the citizens generate incomes by engaging in productive labor; but they too can be mobilized either to seize the income of others – or to defend their incomes from seizure. The three personages in this drama repeatedly interact over time. The question is: Can political order prevail in such a setting? The answer is: Yes. Under certain circumstances, the specialist will chose to use his control of the means of violence to protect rather than to despoil private property. And the groups of citizens will chose to devote their time and energies to labor and leisure and forswear the use of arms, while rewarding the specialist in violence for protecting them against raids by others. In addition, under certain well-specified conditions, these choices will persist in equilibrium, rendering political order a state. The primary reason for this outcome is that the players interact over time. The specialist in violence and political organizations can therefore condition their future choices on present behavior; that is, they can make threats and inflict punishments and thus shape the behavior of others. Should one group raid or withhold tax payments, the specialist can retaliate by changing from guardian to predator.