Abstract

How can we acquire knowledge of metaphysical modality? How can someone come to know that he could have been elsewhere right now, or an accountant rather than a philosophy teacher, but could not have been a turnip? Jago proposes an account of a route to knowledge of the way things could have been and must be. He argues that we can move to knowledge of metaphysical modality from knowledge about essence. Curtis rejects Jago’s explanation. It cannot, he argues, explain our knowledge of de re necessity. We agree. But there is more to be said. To give an account of our knowledge of metaphysical necessity is part of the task Jago set himself. But another part is to give an account of the knowledge of the (non-actual) possibilities accorded to particular objects. And prior to both what is needed, and something Jago attempts to supply, is an account of how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties. We argue that Jago’s accounts of both these additional matters are also unsatisfactory. This is important because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what must be done to justify the thought. The flaws in his proposal thus indicate the work needed if the attractive thought is to be accepted.

Highlights

  • The Aristotelian concept of essence, of ‘what it is to be’, and the link, if any, between that concept and the modal concepts of necessity and possibility were core topics of metaphysical discussion in the centuries that followed its introduction

  • Extended author information available on the last page of the article. Axiomathes he saw a link between modal concepts and concepts closely related to that of essence, in the Topics defining the notion of an accidental property, for example, in terms of a property that might or might not belong to an object

  • The issue of the link between essence and modality persisted beyond antiquity and was discussed at length by Avicenna and the scholastic philosophers in the middle ages (e.g. Boethius, Aquinas, Ockham) where the question of whether essence can be separated from existence took center stage, with modal notions playing key roles in the debate. (See, e.g. Witt 2011; Normore 2012) And in modernity too the link was widely discussed, with both Locke and Mill, to give just two examples, taking positions on the matter. (Locke 1975, Bk. 3, Chap. 3; Mill 1843, Bk. 1, Chap. vi)

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Summary

Introduction

The Aristotelian concept of essence, of ‘what it is to be’, and the link, if any, between that concept and the modal concepts of necessity and possibility were core topics of metaphysical discussion in the centuries that followed its introduction. We argue that Jago’s essentialist account of our knowledge of de re metaphysical modality fails He does not succeed in explaining how knowledge of de re metaphysical ncecessity can be acquired on the basis of knowledge of the essential properties of individuals. He does not succeed in explaining how ordinary knowers can come to have knowledge of an individual’s essential properties This is important because the thought that our knowledge of metaphysical modality has its source in our knowledge of essence is currently an attractive one and Jago has set out very clearly what has to be done to justify the thought. We give the arguments for the contentions just made after first outlining the structure of Jago’s paper and filling out the details of the essentialist position he adopts (inspired by Fine)

Jago’s Paper
Essentialism
Knowledge of de re Necessities
Knowledge of de re Possibility
Knowledge of Essences
Conclusion
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