From Deterrence to Disarmament

Abstract

of the burgeoning areas of controversy among students of Western military policy today is that concerning the relative efficacy of deterrence, arms control, and multilateral disarmament. Omitting preventive war at one end, and unilateral disarmament at the other, we find that these three intermediate positions seem to be receiving most of the attention within the arms policy continuum. For the most part, the adherents of each position tend to look at the other two with a somewhat jaundiced eye. To the deterrer, arms control implies compromises which could weaken our overall physical and psychological capabilities, while disarmament implies something akin to surrender. To the arms controller, both deterrence and disarmament are seen to be too destabilizing. And to the multilateral disarmer, both of the other positions seem woefully inadequate. Only occasionally is it suggested that a meaningful synthesis of all three positions is both desirable and feasible. My own view is that a very definite relationship logical and chronological does exist among these alleged alternatives, and that each has a significant role to play in any coherent security policy. The purpose of this paper is to explore a broad segment of the arms policy continuum in terms of a sequence of processes which not only bear an intimate relationship to one another, and to the larger political environment, but which suggest a coherence and continuity which have been notably lacking in Western military policy. Before examining these particular phases, however, it might be useful to discuss briefly those characteristics of the political and perceptual setting which indicate why an emphasis on weapons themselves seems more relevant than focussing on territorial settlements, cultural exchanges, increased trade, and the like.