Abstract

The availability of access to Integrated Circuits' scan chain is an inevitable requirement of modern ICs for testability/debugging purposes. However, leaving access to the scan chain OPEN resulted in numerous security threats on ICs. It raises challenging concerns particularly when the secret asset, like secret information, is placed within the chip, such as the keys of cryptographic algorithms, or similarly logic obfuscation key. So, to combat these threats, numerous secure scan chain architectures have been proposed in the literature to prevent any unauthorized access to the scan chain. They also keep the availability of the scan chain for testability/debugging. In this paper, we first show why a secure scan chain architecture is required when security primitives, like logic obfuscation, are in place. Then, we provide a holistic overview of all secure scan chain architectures starting from preliminary methods introduced when cryptography is in place and the adversary threat model is very limited. It is then followed by newer and more advanced methods introduced when logic obfuscation is in place and the adversary threat model is much stronger. Hence, we have more concentration on the architecture proposed more recently on logic obfuscation. We evaluate all secure scan chain architectures in terms of security and resiliency, testability/debugging time and complexity, and area/power/delay overhead.

Highlights

  • The ever-increasing and huge cost of building and recurring maintenance of a new semiconductor foundry, has pushed many design houses to become fabless [1]

  • PARTIAL SECURE SCAN CHAIN ARCHITECTURE By getting the benefit of combinational ATPG, a partial secure scan chain architecture has been introduced in [70], in which a particular set of scan flip-flops (SFF) are removed from the scan chain such that the resulting kernel, which refers to the sequential circuit without the scan chain, belongs to balancedstructures

  • The bound is increased and previous steps are repeated. This primitive sequential SAT attack is able to break the obfuscated circuit locked by encrypt flip-flop (EFF), it is only applicable to static scan chain obfuscation

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

The ever-increasing and huge cost of building and recurring maintenance of a new semiconductor foundry, has pushed many design houses to become fabless [1]. Due to the lack of reliable monitoring and trustworthiness to offshore fabrication and testing processes, many security threats have emerged such as IP piracy, reverse engineering, counterfeiting, and IC overproduction [2]. To combat these hardware security threats, among various hardware design-for-trust (DfTr) techniques, logic obfuscation [3] engages a form of post-manufacturing programmability in the design, which ensures that the correct functionality will not be revealed without the programming value referred to as the key.

SAT ATTACK AS A TURNING POINT IN LOGIC OBFUSCATION
PARTIAL SECURE SCAN CHAIN ARCHITECTURE
OBFUSCATING THE SCAN CHAIN IN THE PRESENCE OF LOGIC OBFUSCATION
YET ANOTHER DYNAMIC SCAN OBFUSCATION
DYNUNLOCK ATTACK
BLOCKING THE SCAN CHAIN IN THE PRESENCE OF LOGIC OBFUSCATION
MR-DFS
KT-DFS
DISCUSSION AND OPPORTUNITIES
VIII. CONCLUSION
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