From consensus to domination: the intergovernmental union in a crisis situation

Abstract

After clarifying the concept of intergovernmental union, the article analyses the performance of the latter during the euro crisis. The economic policy side of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) epitomises the intergovernmental union because based on the principle of voluntary coordination between member state governments as a condition for advancing the process of integration. Tested during the euro crisis, because of the distrust emerged between member states, EMU has ended up in creating a highly centralised policy regime, where the creditor member states have come to play a domineering role with regard to debtor member states. Hierarchical relations between national governments have finally substituted consensus with domination. The absence of a European legislative check on the decisions taken by the intergovernmental Euro Summit and Eurogroup has made domination an unjustifiable feature in the eyes of the public opinion of the debtor member states.