Abstract

This chapter explores the link between freedom and knowledge or information. I start by considering a number of cases that scholars such as Ian Carter and Matthew Kramer have developed to argue that a lack of knowledge can constitute a decrease of one’s freedom. I offer an alternative analysis of these cases in which epistemic elements and freedom elements are distinguished. I develop a conception of ‘epistemic freedom’ according to which an agent is epistemically free to the extent that they can (i) adopt the appropriate doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief), on the basis of (ii) performing investigative actions, which (iii) justify the adopted doxastic attitude. I show that this alternative analysis is better positioned to deal with such diverse notions as science denial, brainwashing, oxytocin (the love hormone, or liquid trust), doxastic voluntarism, contextual framing in news shows, the Kuleshov effect, and neuromarketing.

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