Abstract
SUMMARY Mind sciences have not yet provided a denitive answer to the dual nature of self and to the existence of Free-will (FW), so the mechanisms operating in cognitive processes such as action decision-making remain partially elusive. In this review, we address the question of a so-called “voluntary” action from the agent’s and the scientist’s points of view (respectively from 1 st and 3 rd person perspectives) and conclude that the “Bignetti Model” (TBM) may offer a solution to reconcile both; i.e. FW is an illusion in line with the agent’s belief in the soul-embodied self and, along with this belief, it may play a functional role in cognition. With TBM, we explain cognition in a bottom-up track from a molecular to a psychological level without the need of soul-body duality. KEYWORDS: Bignetti model; Self; Free-will; Probabilism; Determinism; Cognition; Inner speech;Bayes’theory ABBREVIATIONS: FW: Free-will; TBM: Bignetti Model; fMRI: functional Magnetic Reso-nance Imaging; EEG: Electroencephalograph; BCI: Brain-Computer Interface; CEMI: Con-sciousness electromagnetic eld theory; MM: Michaelis and Menten; SoO: Sense of owner-ship; SoA: Sense of agency; CM: Conscious Mind; UM: Unconscious Mind; IS: Inner Speech; BDT: Bayesian Decision Theory; AI: Articial Intelligence
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