From Aquino to Marcos: political survival and Philippine foreign policy towards China

Abstract

ABSTRACT How does the Philippines form its foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Existing work on the Philippine foreign policy toward China explains the country’s stance solely through geopolitical or domestic factors. By examining the political calculus of, and the policy formulation by, the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016), Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), and Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (2022-) administrations, I argue that a combination of domestic politics, geopolitical considerations, and economic realities have shaped the approach of the Philippines toward China. Rather than focus on one factor to explain the Philippines’ foreign policy, I suggest that the combination and interaction of these three factors accounting for how various Philippine administrations have operated explains the Philippines’ China policies. Furthermore, I nuance these three factors through the lens of political survival. I suggest that leaders stay in power by accumulating political power and staving off challengers. In the Philippines, I suggest that leaders capitalize on criticizing or deviating from the prior administration’s China policies, which have resulted in economic or political effects that generate resentment from the population. As a result, Presidents often reverse or modify the policies set about by the previous administration, resulting in a new set of approaches toward China. Data on this paper was facilitated by years of fieldwork conducted in the Philippines between 2017 to 2020. I interviewed officials in the Aquino, Duterte, and Marcos administrations, Filipino oligarchs, political brokers, lawyers, political party representatives, and in-country observers.