Fórmula para o caos: A derrubada de Salvador Allende (1970 – 1973)

Abstract

Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira’s captivating account of the opposition to the Popular Unity government in Chile (1970 – 73) details the impossibility of the plan for the Chilean way to socialism (“la via chilena con vino y empanadas”). The Popular Unity government faced challenges from their own supporters who adopted increasingly radical tactics such as tomas (takeovers) and land invasions. Due to the historical context of the early 1970s, Salvador Allende found little material support from the Soviet Union or Cuba. For instance, in December 1972, Allende traveled to the Soviet Union to negotiate a loan for US $500 million but returned with promises for a loan for only US $100 million. As Moniz Bandeira claims, “ ‘El hermano mayor’ did not have any resources available to support a new member who wanted to enter the family ‘with wine and meat pies’ ” (p. 392). In addition, Allende faced well-organized and financially strong opposition from the CIA and the Nixon administration, factions of the Chilean Armed Forces, U.S. and Chilean corporations, the Chilean media, right-wing terrorist groups, and even foreign diplomats such as Brazilian ambassador Antônio Cândido da Câmara Canto (1970 – 73). What is most chilling to read in Fórmula para o caos is how detailed and multilayered the plans actually were to create a situation in which a military coup and military government seemed like the best solution. While Moniz Bandeira’s evidence is solid, the story seems almost implausible in terms of how effectively the plans were designed and executed, leaving the impression that Allende and the Popular Unity government had no chance to succeed.As documents on the Cold War in Latin America continue to be released and new archives open, scholars are able to construct historical narratives based on evidence showing the plans and links amongst the military regimes in Latin America. Moniz Bandeira’s Fórmula para o caos is a welcome addition to the historiography on inter-American Cold War relations. Whereas Greg Grandin’s Empire’s Workshop (2006) makes Guatemala the exemplary case to explain Cold War politics in Central America, Moniz Bandeira focuses on Chile as the key example of Cold War politics in the Southern Cone. Similar to other studies on Salvador Allende, the Popular Unity, and the military coup of 1973, Moniz Bandeira uses documents from Peter Kornbluh’s Chile Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, and other U.S. government documents such as Senate hearings and reports on the International Telephone and Telegraph Company in Chile. He also draws from relatively new electronic archives in Chile such as the Centro de Estudios Miguel Enríquez (CEME) Arquivo Chile.But, what is most interesting about this book is what is missing from its title. Moniz Bandeira’s breadth of knowledge about Brazilian politics during the dictatorship and his use of documents from the Itamaraty, Ministry of Foreign Relations, and Brazilian National Archives illustrate how the Brazilian military government supported and pro moted coups and military regimes in Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Argentina. He also provides evidence of how the Brazilian Armed Forces, Brazilian banks, and Brazilian corporations — all with ties to the CIA — provided funding and training to opposition groups in Chile, such as Patria y Libertad. Drawing from the experience of successful tactics used in the Brazilian coup of 1964, such groups orchestrated strikes and women’s protest marches to create the notion of instability and popular opposition to Allende. After the coup, Brazilian ambassador Câmara Canto visited members of the Chilean military junta, Brazil being the first country to extend official recognition to the new government. In the days immediately following the coup, the Brazilian Armed Forces transported 20 tons of food provisions and medical supplies to Santiago, and the Central Bank of Brazil promised Chile a credit of US $200 million. Although Brazilian general Emílio Garrastazu Médici did not want official involvement in the conspiracy to overthrow Allende, Moniz Bandeira claims that the immediate official recognition, support, and aid for the military junta demonstrates Brazil’s complicity in Chilean politics in the early 1970s.While lengthy, the book is well written and engaging. If it were in English, it would be an excellent text for undergraduate courses on U.S. – Latin American relations. [Editor’s note: The book was published simultaneously in Chile in a Spanish edition.] The book brings to life the extremely politicized atmosphere of the Southern Cone countries in the early 1970s, and Moniz Bandeira makes it seem as though no middle road existed: Public life centered around the divide between being pro-or anti-Communist. In the conclusion, he suggests that Allende’s peaceful way to socialism was a naive dream that lacked historical precedent and was doomed to fail, especially since Allende’s opposition did not hesitate to resort to violence, weapons, and foreign support.