Abstract

ABSTRACTMuch of the extensive historiography of nineteenth-century English friendly societies has focused on their capacity to create social capital and their predisposition towards insolvency, although more recently historians have argued that the ability of affiliated orders to raise levies made them financially stronger than previously supposed. However, given that societies still failed regularly, in what circumstances was it impossible to mount such rescues, and why? This article answers this question through a case study of three small ‘local’ societies in West Kent. Using the perspective of risk and risk transfer, it suggests they all suffered from a serious combination of membership and competitor risk which, when mishandled, also caused significant reputational damage to both societies and their managers. A further major tension was that many local opinion formers were starting to demand higher standards of accountability, including from friendly society trustees. The article also looks at the survival strategies of individual managers and members, arguing that – during financial crises – self-interest exerted powerful forces on those societies. In each case, the evidence reveals that often longstanding local relationships, based on mutual trust and shared values, were fractured so completely that raising levies or other bailouts to keep them afloat proved impossible.

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