Friend or Foe?

Abstract

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-US-ASCII text omitted.)China's civil society is under immense pressure. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, Chinese authorities have cracked down on a score of civil society organisations, while hundreds of activists and dissidents have been detained, arrested, and sentenced to prison. Control over cyberspace has been further tightened, and a new commission has been established to oversee national security across a wide spectrum of issues. A campaign against ?Western values? has been launched, and even the term ?civil society? is becoming increasingly sensitive in public or classroom discussion. As the crackdown continues, one might wonder whether the fang/shoucycle, the alternating pattern of relaxation and control that unleashed China's ?reform and opening up? in the 1980s and 1990s, is still applicable under Xi's China, where control (shou) has now become the norm and relaxation (fang) the exception. Previously, moderate or ?issue-based? groups and activists, although under constant state surveillance, remained intact as long as they steered clear of a political agenda. An Economistarticle in April 2014 even argued that ?a flourishing civil society is taking hold.?(1)A year later, however, it has become questionable whether such an observation is still valid.What are the implications for the development of China's civil society? This paper reviews recent crackdown efforts and new restrictions on civil society, and argues that these measures are diminishing the space for moderate and reformist NGOs and activists to negotiate their survival. It also shows that ad-hoc repression of civil society groups and activists is now moving towards a more systematic restriction of both foreign and domestic NGOs. While civil society is unlikely to disappear due to its resilience and its ability to adapt to barriers, there is little cause for optimism in the coming years.Rampant crackdown on civil societyIn the early days after Xi Jinping assumed office as China's president, the question of whether he was a liberal political reformer emerged among China observers. Yet the debate was brief and speculation was quickly dispelled. As Xi launched a rampant anti-corruption drive targeting both ?tigers? and ?flies,? the successive downfall of high-ranking officials neither opened up room for public criticism of the government nor created space for grassroots civil society to expand and prosper. Instead, Xi ruled out political reform, emphasised cadres' adherence to the central leadership of the Party, and revived the ?mass line? as a Maoist alternative to democracy so as to rebuild the Party's legitimacy among the masses.(2)In addition, Xi also warned against dangerous Western values that constitute ideological threats to China, highlighting seven ideas, including universal values, freedom of speech, and civil society, to be forbidden in public discussion.(3)On the institutional level, Xi's administration founded at least two governmental organisations delegated with expansive power over Chinese society. The National Security Commission, established in early 2014, was made responsible for coordinating a range of national security tasks and making relevant policies, putting paramount importance on safeguarding state security. Meanwhile, a new Internet regulatory body, the Cyberspace Administration of China, was endowed with expanded powers to defend cybersecurity against both domestic and foreign threats.Against the backdrop of a tightened political and ideological space under Xi's rule, the spate of crackdowns against civil society groups and activists came as no surprise. Several activists and opinion leaders were detained and arrested as early as 2013, the most prominent being Xu Zhiyong, a legal activist and the founder of the New Citizens' Movement (xin gongmin yundong ...), who was placed under house arrest in April 2013. Whereas Xu was sentenced to four years in prison in early 2014 for ? …