Friction Ridge Opinion Evidence afterDaubertand theNASReport

Abstract

AbstractFriction ridge opinion evidence—in particular, fingerprint identification testimony—has been admitted in courts in the United States for over a century, but the milestones ofDaubertand the “NASReport” mark changes in the legal landscape concerning the admission of friction ridge opinion evidence. The seminal events of the 1993 United States Supreme Court opinion inDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticalsand the 2009 publication of the National Academy of Sciences Report “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward” sparked challenges to the admission of friction ridge opinion testimony and the conclusions offered by experts. In this article, the “post‐Daubert” and “post‐NAS Report” decisions concerning the admission of friction ridge opinion evidence will be discussed. As with other areas of forensic science, neitherDaubertnor theNASReport resulted in the widespread exclusion of friction ridge opinion evidence, but the legal landscape has been altered. Admissibility hearings concerning friction ridge comparison evidence, once unheard of with respect to “the gold standard” of forensic science, became more frequent and prompted legal discussions of the subjectivity of the analytical processes. Although the courts have primarily considered any “limitations” in friction ridge comparison methodologies and opinions to be properly addressed through the crucible of cross‐examination, a few courts have barred some phrasings of conclusions and representations of absolute certainty.