Abstract
This paper studies the impact of government's incentives on a fresh-product supply chain (FSC) system with a stochastic multifactor-dependent demand. The investigated supplier–buyer chain is modeled using two different approaches including: 1) the traditional selling cycle (TSC) in the open market without considering the government's incentives; and 2) the modern selling cycle (MSC) in the organized market considering the government's incentives. In the TSC approach, a Stackelberg game model is proposed for deteriorating products by considering the shortage inventory, the leftover inventory, and value-added tax (VAT) plan. The stochastic demand is dependent on the retail price, freshness degree of the fresh-product item, and marketing efforts. To develop a model for the MSC approach, we have extended the model of a TSC approach considering the government's incentives including short-term tax breaks and a single-window system. Finally, the proposed models are approved with a dataset from a real-life case study. The results show that the government's incentives increase the profit of all the FSC members under the MSC approach. Moreover, the results of conducted sensitivity analyses help governments to accurately adjust the VAT rate and commission percentages in TSC and MSC approach, respectively.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
