Abstract

While most discussions of the international efforts at post-war exploitation of German science and technology by the Allied occupation powers assume similar methods and aims across the nations involved, the French case diverges in important ways because of a fundamentally different understanding of technology transfer. The Americans and British hoped to enlist the French in exploitation programmes similar to their own, and to an extent succeeded, but persistent distrust of French motives largely prevented this co-operation from forging similarities beyond the surface level. French policy-makers’ alternate conception of science and technology as socially embedded led to very different strategies for exploiting German advances, and despite post-war antagonism, led to Franco-German research collaboration that would prove valuable building relationships between these nations.

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