French Counterinsurgency (COIN) Efforts in Spain During the Napoleonic Era - A Modern Analysis Through the Lens of the Principles of COIN In US Joint Doctrine

Abstract

Abstract : This paper attempts to portray the failures of French counterinsurgency efforts in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars in relation to US COIN tenets of understanding the Operating Environment, Unity of Command and Unity of Effort, and developing the COIN narrative. A truly effective COIN strategy encompasses a whole-of-government approach but the tenets of primacy of politics and securing the population would exceed the scope of this paper. The method of research involved a comparison of these modern COIN principles with historical examples from the time of Napoleon s actions in Spain. At the conclusion of the research, the key findings were of no surprise. Napoleon, King Joseph Bonaparte, and his commanders in the field failed to grasp the sociocultural issues motivating the insurgents, clumsily attempted to establish unity of command that failed to achieve a unified COIN effort against the insurgency, and developed a narrative that countered an effective COIN strategy. In conclusion, by comparing historical examples to modern doctrine, the reader can debate how effective the counterinsurgency could have been and evaluate the effectiveness of contemporary COIN doctrine.