Abstract
Britain and France have always been considered as special players in the nuclear deterrence game. Their respective arsenals have never exceeded a very small fraction of the USSR’s and the United States’ strategic forces; Britain’s and France’s rationales for having nuclear weapons have been based on criteria tailored specifically for medium nuclear powers. Moreover, in sharp contrast with both superpowers, the development costs of the French and British nuclear forces have been very high, penalizing conventional forces in the case of France and leading to a growing dependence on the United States in the case of the United Kingdom (UK). Finally, although Paris and London have been able to draw advantages from the possession of nuclear forces, they have never been in a position to offer an explicit nuclear guarantee to their European allies, thus leaving the United States as the sole provider of extended deterrence within the framework of the integrated military structure of the Atlantic alliance.
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