Abstract
Abstract Frege’s puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object’s self-identity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural languages since natural sentences, unlike those of regimented formal ones, do not wear their logical properties on their sleeves. In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and therefore to set up the puzzle in natural languages. Frege’s puzzle is here to stay.
Highlights
In this paper we argue that, on the contrary, there exists a notion of coordination between names which is apt to track the relevant logical properties of natural sentences and to set up the puzzle in natural languages
As the quotation above makes clear, Frege conceived the puzzling predicament as that of explaining how true identity sentences of these two forms can differ in cognitive value when they are identical in reference and, because of that, made true by the same object’s self-identity
Given that an identity of the logical form a = a is formalizable by a single variable, one could suggest that this is so because it is flanked by a single name repeated twice over, as opposed to potentially informative identities, which are flanked by two independent names
Summary
Almog (2008), Glezakos (2009), and Paganini (2016) suggest that we abandon Frege’s ship still on its maiden voyage: its assumption that we can learn anything about an identity’s potential informativity (or triviality) by assessing its form To be sure, they obviously agree that some identities are informative while others are not, but argue that, given how logically untidy natural language is,. The main objective of this paper is showing that these three authors are wrong, that is, that we can formulate Frege’s puzzle in the context of a natural language by appealing to a notion of form. All of these notions might further divide into different variants depending on how one chooses to characterize, respectively, semantic, syntactical and logical identity (and difference) Which of these notions could - if any at all - help us formulate Frege’s puzzle in the context of a natural language?
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
