Frege on logical axioms and non‐evidential epistemic warrants: A paragraph from Grundgesetze

Abstract

AbstractCriticizing psychologism about logic in the Foreword of Grundgesetze, Frege examines an answer to the question of how we can justify our acknowledgment of logical axioms as true—the logical laws that cannot be proved from other laws. The answer he entertains states that we cannot reject logical axioms if we do not want to give up our judgment altogether. Suspending his judgment about this answer, Frege points out that it is still compatible with his anti‐psychologist conception of logic. There are two issues with this paragraph. First, it is difficult to read this paragraph consistently. Second, it is not clear why Frege brings up this particular view regarding the justification for logical axioms in the middle of his criticism of psychologism. This paper develops a consistent interpretation of this paragraph. The view on the justification for logical axioms, which Frege is dealing with, is neo‐Kantian. In the paragraph, Frege is criticizing a psychologistic misunderstanding of the neo‐Kantian justification for logical axioms. The way Frege explains away this misunderstanding shows that he takes the neo‐Kantian justification for logical axioms to be a non‐evidential epistemic warrant if it is an epistemic warrant. It is this notion of non‐evidential epistemic warrant that Frege suspends his judgment about. Thus, the paragraph shows that Frege has a reason to have reservations about neo‐Kantianism. Furthermore, it turns out that the sole issue between Frege and psychological logicians is whether truth is objective, which provides a different way to explain away a much‐discussed tension between Begriffsschrift and Frege's anti‐psychologism.