Frege and the determination of reference

Abstract

The question of how reference is determined should be distinguished from the question of what reference is. The latter calls for a theory that explaips the role of the notion of reference within the framework of a more general theory of language. The former does not call for that much: it rather assumes that the general notion of reference is well understood, and asks about the ways by which a particular reference is associated with a partic? ular term. The two questions, however, are not independent of each other: for a plausible theory of the determination of reference may be reasonably regarded as an effective constraint on an adequate theory of what reference is. Thus, one would hardly endorse a theory of reference that construes this notion in such a way that the determination of the referents of particular terms is rendered epistemologically inaccessible. And by the same reason? ing, one should not describe the way reference is determined in a manner that would make the notion of reference incapable of fulfilling its role in a general theory of language, or in a general model of understanding. Frege's notion of reference, for instance, was governed by two basic principles, which reflect the above consideration: on the one hand it was supposed to provide the basic notion of a systematic theory of the truth conditions of sentences, while on the other it was construed as determined by a cognitive aspect of the use, and understanding of a language, namely, by the senses (Sinne) of its expressions. This last principle is the focus of this paper. The main question we shall be dealing with is: What is the status of the thesis that sense determines reference in Frege's philosophy of language? Frege's endorsement of the thesis is notorious, and it has been heavily criticized in recent years. However, it seems to me that both with regard to its exact interpretation and to the role it plays in Frege's philosophy of language the thesis is still in need of further clarification. The main claim of the present article is that a certain "realistic" interpretation of the above thesis is implied by Frege's main argument for the distinction between sense and reference, and that under this interpretation the thesis meets