Abstract

Individual decision-making regarding vaccination may be affected by the vaccination choices of others. As vaccination produces externalities reducing transmission of a disease, it can provide an incentive for individuals to be free-riders who benefit from the vaccination of others while avoiding the cost of vaccination. This study examined an individual's decision about vaccination in a group setting for a hypothetical disease that is called “influenza” using a computerized experimental game. In the game, interactions with others are allowed. We found that higher observed vaccination rate within the group during the previous round of the game decreased the likelihood of an individual's vaccination acceptance, indicating the existence of free-riding behavior. The free-riding behavior was observed regardless of parameter conditions on the characteristics of the influenza and vaccine. We also found that other predictors of vaccination uptake included an individual's own influenza exposure in previous rounds increasing the likelihood of vaccination acceptance, consistent with existing empirical studies. Influenza prevalence among other group members during the previous round did not have a statistically significant effect on vaccination acceptance in the current round once vaccination rate in the previous round was controlled for.

Highlights

  • Promoting vaccination is an important goal in public health policy

  • As the result of herd immunity, the risk of infection for an individual depends on other individuals’ vaccination status; risk of infection generally decreases as the vaccination coverage in a community increases regardless of an individual’s vaccination status

  • Our results showed that individuals’ vaccination decisions were significantly influenced by observed vaccination rate during the previous round, suggesting free-riding behavior

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Summary

Introduction

Promoting vaccination is an important goal in public health policy. Influenza vaccination coverage in the United States is still far below the public policy goal. Vaccination may be discouraged by the incentive to ‘‘free-ride’’. Referred to as ‘‘free-riders’’ in vaccination, these individuals avoid the cost associated with vaccination while benefiting from other individuals’ vaccination [1] [2]. Vaccination for infectious diseases produces herd immunity, providing indirect benefit to unvaccinated individuals. As the result of herd immunity, the risk of infection for an individual depends on other individuals’ vaccination status; risk of infection generally decreases as the vaccination coverage in a community increases regardless of an individual’s vaccination status

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